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This thesis is an application of the methodology in studies by-
Beaver and one by Dascher to an analysis of the financially troubled
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. These three previous studies used
financial ratios in attempting to predict failure. All three studies
were performed with firms that had already failed. Their results
demonstrate that there is a significant difference in financial ratios
of failed and non-failed firms. This difference is particularly
obvious when observing the non-liquid asset ratios.
This thesis attempts to determine Lockheed's solvency in 1971,
when it claimed to be facing bankruptcy. The conclusion is that
failure in 1971 was, indeed, quite probable. In addition, Lockheed's
ratios are analyzed during 1971-1972, as the firm has stated that
it faces a new crisis, though not nearly of the proportion of the 1971
disaster. These last two years will serve as a starting point for
future ratio analyses of Lockheed.
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Lockheed Aircraft Corporation claimed to be facing bankruptcy
in 1971 because it was running out of cash. [^Ref. lj[ This situation,
coupled with the actual bankruptcy of Rolls-Royce Ltd., caused the
British government and Lockheed to petition the United States
Government for an emergency loan guarantee of $250 million.
The guarantee was approved in the form of a bill called the
Emergency Loan Guarantee Act by the Senate on a slim 49-48 vote.
The closeness of the vote hints at the controversy that preceeded
the final decision. Many senators felt that Lockheed had no grounds
for requesting this assistance and felt that the company would receive
financial help from its banks with or without a guarantee. Others
felt that the natural processes of competition were at work and the
government had no right in manipulating the economy. \__Ref . 2^\
The majority, however, felt that the company was in real danger
of going bankrupt and needed Federal financial assistance in order
to survive. Lockheed's position as a major defense contractor and
also the request of the British government were important factors
to be considered.
Whether Lockheed would have failed if the Senate had rejected
the loan will never really be known. However, several previous
empirical studies have produced some important theories on the
predictability of financial failure. It is the intent of this thesis to
use these former studies as a base and attempt to determine whether
Lockheed was on the path to bankruptcy in the year 1971. Also
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included will be an similar analysis for the years 1971-1972, since
Lockheed again claimed to face cash problems when financially
troubled Eastern Air Lines asked for a stretched-out delivery schedule
of its ordered L- 101 Is. [kef. 3^
Those previous works that play an important part in this thesis are
two studies by William Beaver in 1966 and 1968 and a study by Paul
Dascher in 1970. Several important observations were gleaned from
these three studies that, their authors claimed, were highly predictive
of failure. Two of these observations were the following:
1. Non-liquid asset ratios predict failure better than liquid
asset ratios.
2. Failed firms' ratios tend to deteriorate markedly from
those of non-failed firms as failure approaches.
These symptoms seemed to fit very well the situation of Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation in the 1966-1970 time-period. Many of Lockheed's
ratios were quite different than those of the rest of the industry-
-
especially the non-liquid asset ratios. These differences seemed to
become more pronounced as 1971 approached. Lockheed's average
ranking by ratios in the industry declined markedly over the period
of this study. It was these main points that led to the conclusion that
Lockheed was headed for failure.
The ratios for 1971 and 1972 show also that Lockheed is below the
industry average. However, these ratios, while low, are not as bad
as they were in 1970. Several of the ratios are in a downward trend.
Nevertheless, while the ratios reflect a dependence on inventory
realization, they still have not degenerated in 1972 to the point where
subsequent bankruptcy is evident.
11

II. HISTORY OF LOCKHEED
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was incorporated on June 21, 1932.
It succeeded the Lockheed Aircraft Company (incorporated in 1926 in
Delaware), which was to become the heavier-than-air division of the
Detroit Aircraft Corporation. The latter company went bankrupt but
Lockheed lived on. The newly incorporated firm's first successful
plane was the Model 10 "Electra. " More than 150 of these were sold
to domestic and foreign airlines before the start of the Second World
War.
The success of the Electra- 10 didn't end there, however, as
modifications thereto produced the Model 12 and Model 14. One
hundred and fourteen units of the "12" were sold. The Model 14
"Sky Zephyr" was converted to a bomber, and the British initially
bought 200 of these in 1937. The performance of the plane, which
became known as the B-14 "Hudson, " was praised highly by the
British; and they subsequently bought over 1, 000 of them before the
war's end.
Lockheed also introduced the Model 18 "Lodestar" and was working
on the 4-engine "Constellation" in the late thirties, but, as the war
approached, the company's efforts shifted from civilian aviation to
military needs. During the war the company produced 10 per cent of
the total American output of war planes, some 15, 000 units. These
included the P-38 "Lightning, " the "Hudson, " the B-17 "Flying
Fortress, " the "Harpoon, " and the "Ventura PV. "
12

A. WAR'S END TO THE SIXTIES
With the war winding down, Lockheed turned its attention back to
the commercial market and pushed development of a 100-seat passenger
plane it had designed initially for Pan-Am in 1940. This previous work
gave Lockheed an advantage over competition, and the corporation
aggressively marketed the new "Constellation. " (Orville Wright
piloted the plane in a demonstration flight.) I Ref. 4j The "Connie"
became one of the most familiar commercial aircraft ever produced.
The advent of the 'cold war' refocused attention on military aircraft
production, and Lockheed quickly established itself as a leader in
that field with the P-80 "Shooting Star, " the first operational jet
fighter. The P-80 (later the name was changed to the F-80) was mod-
ified to become the T-33 "T-Bird, " and this plane was in turn modified
to become the F-94 "Starfire. " All three were highly regarded
by the military and over 7, 000 of these planes were sold - 800 F-80's,
6, 000T-33's, and 600 F-94's. Another successful post-war plane
was the P2V "Neptune, " used primarily by the Navy for ASW work.
Other profitable ventures in the fifties were the C-130 "Hercules"
and the F-104 "Star- Fighter. " Both were extremely successful and,
although introduced in the early fifties, both are still operational
in 1974.
Contrasting with these notable successed, however, were
several failures. The list includes the "Constitution, " the "Saturn, "
the "Little Dipper, " the "Big Dipper, " and the "Jetstar. " As the
decade came to a close, the successes of the company pushed
Lockheed toward a position of being heavily dependent on the military.
13

The "Constellation" was its only highly successful civilian venture
and, even at that, many were sold to the military.
With this in mind the company attempted to enter the commercial
market (it's first love) |Ref. 5, p. 45_\ with the Electra, a new
passenger plane with the same name as its 1930s' predecessor. It
was a turbo-prop introduced late in the 1950s', just when Lockheed's
competitors were about to deliver the first jet airliners. The Boeing
707 and the Douglas DC 8 swept the Electra and Lockheed from the
commercial airliner market. | Ref . 6, p. 4\ In addition, two well
publicized crashes of the Electra sapped its potential even further.
The Electra experience made the company even more military-
dependent than before.
As Lockheed grew during the fifties, it diversified into other
areas. It set up the Lockheed Missile Systems Division in 1953.
It purchased Puget Sound Bridge and Dry Dock Company in 1959 and
entered the shipbuilding, ship repair and general construction
business.
B. THE SIXTIES
The early years of the decade of the 1960s' were a time of
cold war, response to the Sputnik and increased defense spendings.
The United States was becoming more involved in the Viet Nam War.
Lockheed, being highly military-oriented, was in an excellent
position to take advantage of the path the United States was to follow.
Lockheed was prime contractor for the Polaris missile program
and its follow-on, the Poseidon. Through modification, the commer-
cially disastrous Electra turned into a military profit maker. It
14

became known as the P-3 "Orion", and took over the role of the P-2V
as an ASW patrol plane. The company won contracts for building
destroyer escorts and amphibious assault transports for the Navy.
Also, Lockheed was to build the C5A for the Air Force, the Cheyenne
Helicopter for the Army and the SRAM rocket motor for Boeing Aircraft
Corp. These contracts helped Lockheed become the largest Defense
contractor in the years 1962-1966. (It was #2 in 1961 and 1968 and
#3 in 1967.) Lockheed's good fortune was reflected in its stock price
and its ability to place debentures. JRef. 7 \
However, Lockheed did find itself excessively dependent on
military contracts (90% of its sales during the 1960s' were to DOD).
Hence, on May 2, 1967 it disclosed plans that it was exploring three
new commercial ventures. This occured after losing to Boeing in
the bidding for the SST contract. The three programs were a large
frame subsonic passenger jet, a commercial air cargo plane and a
rigid rotor commercial helicopter. j"Ref. 8\ Later that year, the
decision to produce a large passenger jet plane was made and the
L-1011 "Tristar" was born.
1. A Crisis Begins
Troubles were beginning to mount in the late sixties when
problems with several defense contracts became apparent. Costs
were running higher than contracts allowed, and Congressional
criticism of excess defense spending was becoming fashionable.
Four of Lockheed's programs came under sharp scrutiny.
These were the C5A, the Cheyenne Helicopter, the SRAM motor and
several Navy shipbuilding contracts. The first three of these programs
were under "total package" procurement contracts covering both
15

design and production. Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara had
introduced this contracting concept earlier in the decade. Prior to
the total package concept, DOD would contract for the design phase
of a system and the production phase separately. This usually led
to the winner of the design phase ultimately winning the production
phase, and the total package contract was instituted to overcome a
resultant problem. It was charged that contractors bid exceedingly
low on the design phase in the knowledge that they could cover their
losses on the production phase.
While the total package idea was well meant, Melvin Laird,
Secretary of Defense in the late sixties, rejected it as unworkable.
Contractors said that ultimate costs were impossible to estimate.
Although complex clauses in this type of contract were supposed to
protect both buyer and seller as program changes were made, they
more often led to sharp disagreements. Lockheed claimed that the
total package system had proved virtually unworkable and that
existing contracts should be revised. \R ei - 9j The company also
admitted being overly optimistic in its bidding, however. jRef. 10 I
When Lockheed didn't get what it considered fair payments,
it took its case to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
However, a decision here would take years and, in the meantime,
the company had to live under the contracts it originally signed.
Lockheed's on-going programs, meanwhile, were causing a tremendous
cash drain. The crisis came to a boil on March 6, 1970, when
Lockheed threatened to stop work on the four programs if it didn't re-
ceive iterim financing. YRef. 9j DOD replied six months later by
proposing a plan in which the Government would provide funds if
16

Lockheed assumed over $480 million in losses and dropped its court
case. At first, Lockheed rejected this proposal and said it would
settle the issue in court. However, it soon became clear that the
company's lack of cash flow, was becoming critical. Also, extension
of a very substantial line of bank credit was contingent upon settlement
of the government disputes. With no other choice available, Lockheed
accepted the government's proposal.
2. L-1011 "Tristar"
The losses on the four defense contracts had ramifications
in other parts of the company as well. Half of the $400 million bank
line of credit that was initially earmarked for the L-1011 airbus
was diverted to cover cash shortages on the defense contracts. [Ref. 6, p. i\
With such internal problems raging, the L-1011 ran into
external troubles as well. It was encountering sharp competition from
both the Boeing 747 and the McDonnell Douglas DC10. Both planes
had beaten Lockheed to the market in the race for customers, although
the 747, with its greater range and capacity, wasn't a direct competitor.
In addition, the rate of growth in air travel started to fall off in the
early seventies; and this hurt the sales of all three "jumbo jet"
manufacturers
.
The biggest blow to Lockheed came when Rolls-Royce, which
was to produce the RB211 engine for the Tristar, declared bankruptcy.
Apparently, Rolls-Royce had bid very low to get the contract against
the stiff competition of General Electric and Pratt & Whitney. The
British Government entered the picture and agreed to stand behind
the operations of Rolls-Royce. However, Lockheed would have to
incur increased costs for the engines - roughly $330 thousand
17

more per engine, or $1 million per plane. The British government
also wanted a guarantee that Lockheed would actually buy all 555
engines.
Since Lockheed's finances were in a precarious position due
to its defense contract disputes, the British wanted the United States
Government to provide assistance to Lockheed. President Nixon on
May 7, 1971 asked Congress for a loan guarantee for Lockheed, and
a heated debate ensued that summer. The company based its claim
for help on the following financial data: JJRef. 11, p. 24-25]
Cash and equivalent (Jan. 1, 1971) $ 79 million
Line of credit remaining $ 50 million
1129" million
New Cash flow (Jan. -Jun. 1971) $ 20 million
Use of credit remaining ($ 50) million
$ 99 million
New cash flow (Jul. -Sept. 1971) ($ 91) million
Balance (Sept. 30, 1971) $ 8 million
Lockheed's average monthly interest expense $2. 5 million
Lockheed's average monthly wages expense $7.0 million
In addition, Lockheed's consortium of creditors said they would
bar any new loans to the company without a government guarantee.
Reasons given by the White House for approval of the bill
(Emergency Loan Guarantee Act) were the threatened unemployment
of 30,000 people, economic losses affecting the U. S. GNP and
California's GNP, complications in other Lockheed defense contracts
(most notably the Trident, the S-3 and the SR-71), and the loss of a
big competitor from the aerospace industry. [_Ref. 11, pp. 32-43J
Reasons brought forth by critics against passage of the bill focused
on the dangers of manipulating the competitive system and the setting
of a bad precedent. 1 Ref. 2 I
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Ostensibly, the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act was intended
"to provide credit to large, well established and creditworthy
enterprises"; \Ref. 11, p. 3J but, in fact, Lockheed was the sole
applicant. Ultimately, the bill was approved by a vote of 49-48 in
the Senate; and the Emergency Loan Board was set up in early August.
This allowed Lockheed an additional $250 million in financing with
which to continue development of its Tristar.
C. THE EARLY SEVENTIES
After the loan guarantee, fiscal years 1972 and 1973 were spent
obtaining orders for the L-1011, filling orders for existing defense
systems, working on the development of new systems for recently
won contracts and drawing down the $250 million loan for v/ork on
the L-1011. By June 30, 1972, Lockheed had used $150 million.
By December 1973 the total guaranteed loans had risen to $200 million.
Sales for the L-1011 were slow because of the drop in the rate
of growth of air travel. In December 1973 Lockheed had kept pace
with its competition with 199 orders and options. McDonnell- Douglas
had 230 orders and options for its DC10. ^Ref. 14, p. A21J Lockheed
had earlier estimated a total market of 1, 325 trijets by 1980, and
it expected to get its share of that potential, j Ref . 15 1
1. A New Crisis
By late 1973, the company claimed again to be in financial
troubles and was looking for further financing, a merger partner,
speed up of L-1011 deliveries, or some combination of the three.
Lockheed's inventory was the only asset on its balance sheet that was
rising substantially, and $959 million of the total $1, 065 million in
19

inventory were associated with the L-1011. YRef. 12, p. 12 Of
this L-1011 inventory, over $137 million were deferred R&D costs
and general and administrative expenses. *
Lockheed reported earnings of $15 million and $16 million in
1971 and 1972 respectively. Development costs which were included
in inventories for the L-1011 in those two years were $82 million
and $55 million respectively. }_Ref. 16 J Obviously, expensing
R&D costs would severely affect Lockheed's earnings.
Also, while Lockheed claimed that, because of fewer models
and a newer plant, its breakeven volume for the L-1011 was 300
planes (as compared to McDonnell- Douglas's estimate of 450 for
its DC10), this low figure was questionable. \Ref. 14, p. A21_\
The company received a qualified opinion on its financial statements
each year since 1970.
* Lockheed isn't the only company which is deferring program
development costs, however. McDonnell- Douglas is deferring
such costs on the DC10. No other aerospace manufacturer is
deferring development costs, but then no other has a large commercial
venture which has not reached the break-even point.
20

III. THE SCOPE AND FOUNDATION OF THE THESIS
The assertion that Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was facing
financial disaster in 1970 made headlines throughout the country and
posed a potentially grave problem for the Department of Defense (DOD).
Lockheed at that time was involved in the production of many weapons
systems for the government. Its ranking as the largest defense
contractor in fiscal years 1962-1966, 1969, and 1970 explain the
reason for DOD's concern.
Lockheed ultimately received a $250 million loan guarantee from
the United States Government. This thesis is an examination into
whether Lockheed was headed for bankruptcy, as its management
claimed. [Ref. 11 Financial ratios will be used exclusively in this
examination.
This is not the first study of its kind. Several empirical studies
have been conducted in an attempt to identify measures which can
forecast the failure of an enterprise. Studies by Paul FitzPatrick,
Arthur Winoker, Raymond Smith, and Charles Merwin all pointed
out correlation between incipient failure and the relative values of
selected financial ratios. I Ref. 18, p. 61] In addition, William
Beaver's two studies in the late 1960's attempted to evaluate the
ability of financial ratios to predict business failures.
A. BEAVER'S STUDIES
In a 1966 study, [Ref. 19J Beaver selected 79 insolvent companies
and individually paired them with 79 solvent firms of similar asset
size within their respective industries. He then performed certain tests
on their ratios. All data used for the ratios were obtained from Moody's




Beaver first compared the means of financial ratios of the failed
companies to those of their unfailed counterparts over a five-year
time period. Using four a priori assumptions, he made predictions
of the results of the paired comparisons of the means. His assumptions
were: {Ref. 19. p. 801
(1) The larger the reservoir of liquid assets, the smaller
the probability of failure.
(2) The larger the net liquid asset flow from operations,
the smaller the probability of failure.
(3) The larger the amount of debt outstanding, the
greater the probability of failure.
(4) The larger the expenditures for operations as a
percentage of sales, the greater the probability
of failure.
Beaver selected six ratios on which to base his predictions. This
choice of ratios was made on the basis of popularity in current
literature, strong performance in previous studies, and the growing
importance being given to the funds flow concept. His ratios and
predictions were as follows: [_Ref. 19, p. 81J
RATIO PREDICTION
Funds flow to total debt Nonfailed > Failed
Net income to total assets Nonfailed > Failed
Total debt to total assets Failed > Nonfailed
Working capital to total assets Nonfailed > Failed
Current ratio Nonfailed > Failed
No-credit interval Nonfailed > Failed
The actual results confirmed Beaver's predictions.
. . .the difference in the mean values is in the predicted direction
for each ratio for all five years before failure. Failed firms
not only have a lower cash flow than nonfailed firms but also a
smaller reservoir of liquid assets. Although the failed firms
have less capacity to meet obligations, they tend to incur more
debt than do nonfailed firms. fRei ' I 9 * P« 89J
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A graph of the means of nonfailed firms versus time before failure
shows that the trend line connecting the plotted points has a zero slope.
Yet, the trend in the means of the failed firms has a marked deterio-
ration and slope. This difference is noticeable five years before
failure. Plotting both the failed and unfailed companies' means on
the same graph shows that the difference in means increases as the
year of failure approaches.
The data demonstrate a substantial degree of consistency.
The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that there is a difference
in failed and unfailed firms. Since the means used in this
comparison had a non-normal distribution, however, no
conclusion could be drawn from the comparison of the
means. (Ref. 19, p. 81J
Therefore, Beaver then used a dichotomous classification test to
make a prediction of a company's success or failure. In this test,
Beaver arranged all the values of the individual financial ratios in
ascending order. The array was inspected and a separation point was
selected. Beaver then assumed that the means of the failed firms were
on one side of the separation point and those of the unfailed firms on
the other side. This separation point is selected so as to minimize
the percentage of incorrect classifications. He then calculated the
number of misclassifications. That is, if he assumed a firm to be
failed (nonfailed) and it was nonfailed (failed), a mis classification
ensued. The results of the dichotomous classification test approximate
what the mean comparisons had already shown.
The ability to predict failure is strongest in the cash flow to <^ _
total debt ratio. . .
Clearly all ratios do not predict equally well. The net income to ^
total assets ratio predicts second best, which is to be expected since
its correlation with the best ratio is higher than the correlation of
any other ratio with the best ratio. The total debt to total asset ratio
predicted next best, with the three liquid asset ratios performing




In a 1968 study, Beaver reported on a continuation of his previous
work. Some conclusions drawn in this report were that the non- liquid ^=~
asset measures predict failure better than the liquid asset measures,
even in the years immediately before failure, and that the two less
frequently advocated liquid asset measures (working capital and cash)
outperform the two frequently advocated ones (current assets and
quick assets). jRef. 21, p. 1 211
B. DASCHER'S STUDY
With Beaver's studies as a starting point, Dascher attempted to
analyze the Perm Central Railroad bankruptcy after the fact. Since
Perm Central had undergone a merger two years before bankruptcy,
data for the study were obtained from the years 1968 and 1969 only.
Dascher based his study on Beaver's results, v/hich suggest that,
when the values of relevant ratios are below established levels, the 4;
company is headed for financial trouble. "The more significant the
difference from acceptable levels, the greater the potential for
failure." [Ref. 18, p. 63J
Dascher used the means of the financial ratios of nine other
railroads as the established level. He used the nine other railroads
in the sample to estimate the parameters of a normal distribution.
He then could compute the probability of an observation, at least
as extreme as the Penn Central value, given an observation from the
same normal distribution; this probability is called the level of
significance. j_Ref. 18* P- 63J The smaller the level of significance,
the higher is the confidence that significant differences do in fact
exist between Penn Central and the industry sample. A low level of
24

significance prevailed. With this information, he concluded that the
Perm Central's failure, in hindsight, was not improbable.
Also in his study, Dascher ranked the relevant ratios of all
the railroads for the two years, and he computed the average of
these rankings. Perm Central's overall rank did improve in 1969
compared with 1968. However, the average of the ranks of the most
important indicators, the non-liquid asset ratios, didn't follow the
overall average and actually were worse in 1969. Penn Central's rank
for the two years was consistently low; only once did any ratio reach
the fifth position or better. Dascher also performed a correlation
coefficient test for the rankings between years 1968 and 1969 and a
high correlation coefficient resulted. These results further support
Dascher's conclusion.
C. THE PRESENT STUDY
The current study is based on the work of both Beaver and
Dascher, but it is closer in format to Dascher's study. The ratios
used by Dascher plus two others (working capital flow /total debt
and net monetary assets flow /total debt) will be employed in this study.
All data used in the computation of the financial ratios were obtained
from Moody's Industrial Manual. A sample of ten aircraft manufactur-
ing firms will comprise the comparative group of this study. A mean
for each ratio of these ten companies will then be compared to the
corresponding ratio of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. In
addition, a ranking of the ratios will be performed. The results will
then be viewed for the five-year interval leading up to the emergency
25

loan guarantee in 1971. A similar analysis will also be conducted
for the years 1971-1972, as Lockheed claims that it again faces
financial crises. [Ref. 3J The dichotomous classification test
will not be used because, as in Dascher's study, there is only
one "failed" firm. The significance test that Dascher performed




Due to the successful predictive results of Dascher's study [Ref. 18_\
and Beaver's 1968 study [Ref. 21J , the same ratios were chosen
for this analysis with two additional ratios that were deemed appropriate.
As mentioned in a previous chapter, the extra two ratios are the
working capital flow /total debt ratio and the net monetary assets
flow /total debt ratio. The former is defined as the change from
year to year in the difference between current assets and current debt
divided by the total debt of the later year. The latter is defined as
the change in the difference between quick assets and current debt
from one year to the next divided by the total debt of the later year.
Both were chosen because of the increased use being made of
the funds flow concept. The working capital flow /total debt was
specifically added because it was felt that this ratio would more
succinctly demonstrate how the firm was taking on added debt and
also as a comparison to the funds flow from operations /total debt
ratio. The net monetary assets flow /total debt was included in
order to observe how Lockheed's increase in inventory effects the
working capital flow /total debt ratio.
A. FOURTEEN BASIC RATIOS
The financial measures that are used in the calculation of the





net income total earnings from operations
total assets the sum of all assets a
company owns
total debt both long-term and short-
term liabilities of a company
plus certain deferrals (e.g.
taxes)
current assets
... those assets which will be
realized in one year or one
operating cycle, whichever
is longer
quick assets current assets minus inventory
and prepaid expenses
current debt those liabilities whose liquida-
tion reasonably requires the
use of current assets or other
current liabilities
working capital current assets-current
liabilities
cash cash and marketable securities
sales the revenue of a company
during a specific year
funds flow from operations net income plus depreciation
and amortization
The two additional ratios chosen for this study plus the ratios derived
from the Table I measures are as follows
:
Working capital flow /total debt
Net monetary assets flow /total debt
Funds flow /total debt
Net income /total assets
Total debt/total assets
Current assets /total assets
Quick assets /total assets
Working capital /total assets
Cash /total assets
Current assets /current debt














L #12. Cash/current debt
^#13. Current assets /sales
#14. Quick assets /sales
«- #15. Working capital/sales
#16. Cash/sales
Ratios #13, #14, #15, and #16 will be collectively called
'turnover ratios'.
Beaver, in his 1968 study, categorized the ratios he was using
into liquid asset ratios and non-liquid asset ratios. Liquid asset
ratios are those which are generally regarded as indicators of short-
term solvency. Likewise, non-liquid asset ratios are measures of
long-term solvency. Therefore, Beaver's 14 ratios can be subdivided
into two groups, liquid asset ratios and non-liquid asset ratios,
according to whether they are long or short term predictors. fRef. 21,
p. 114*] Ratios #3, #4, and #5 are non-liquid asset ratios and
ratios #6 thru #16 are liquid asset ratios.
Funds flow from operations /total debt can be viewed as either
liquid or non-liquid. However, since Beaver concluded that this
ratio is a measure of long-term solvency, he listed it as a non-liquid
asset ratio. [Ref. 21, p. 114J As the two added ratios were not
included in earlier studies, they will not be categorized as either
liquid or non- liquid.
B. THE FIRMS IN THE STUDY
The list of firms chosen as the sample to be compared with
Lockheed were those aerospace/defense companies that could be
found in Moody's Industrial Manual. [Ref . 20J The firms are






#2. Curtiss -Wright Corporation
#3. General Dynamics Corporation
#4. Grumann Corporation
#5. LTV Aerospace Corporation
#6. McDonnell- Douglas Corporation
#7. Northrup Corporation
#8. Rockwell International Corporation
#9. Teledyne, Inc.
#10. United Aircraft Corporation
All financial data used in the analysis come from their financial
statements as listed in Moody's. In the case of LTV Aerospace,
data were not presented for 1971 and 1972. In the case of Rockwell
International, consolidated statements for the years 1966 and 1967 weren't
given and, therefore, the company wasn't included in the calculations
of those years.
All firms are principally involved in the aerospace industry. Some
produce a whole airframe. Some produce only parts of an airframe.
In the former group are Boeing, General Dynamics, Grumann, LTV
Aerospace, McDonnell- Douglas, Northrup, Rockwell International,
and United Aircraft, in addition to Lockheed. In the latter group
are Curtiss -Wright and Teledyne.
Several companies have diversified into other fields, but still
a major portion of each selectee's business is in aviation construction;
and all sell to the Department of Defense. Since the sample includes
only ten firms which were not randomly selected and since there is
only a small population, the assumption of normality cannot be made.
Unlike Dascher's, this study will not use statistical methods based




Financial data for all of the firms used in the study are listed in
Appendix A. With these data, the ratios were calculated for each com-
pany and are included in Appendix B. The means and standard deviations
of the financial ratios for the ten comparative firms and the comparable
ratios for Lockheed are also reported in Appendix B. All the financial
ratios are graphed by year in histogram form with the mean and stan-
dard deviation included. Lockheed's position is indicated by a delta (A).
These histograms are displayed below in Figures 1 thru 16. The
histograms for each ratio are arranged so that the successive means of
the ten comparative companies are aligned vertically. Histograms for
the five years preceding the loan guarantee (1966-1970) appear on the
left side of each figure and those for 1970 plus the two years after the
loan guarantee appear on the right side. The histogram for 1970 is
repeated in order to depict graphically the effect that the loan may have
had on the ratios of the subsequent two years. The means of the
financial ratios of the industry are then compared to Lockheed's
financial ratios in graphic form (Figures 17 thru 32).
The eleven firms were ranked according to their respective values
for each of the sixteen ratios for each year in the study. In each case,
the highest ranking indicates the most favorable ratio value and the
lowest ranking, the weakest value for that ratio. There are eleven
places in the ranking for 1968, 1969, and 1970. In 1966 and 1967 and
again in 1971 and 1972, however, there are only ten places because of
the absence of data for Rockwell International and LTV Aerospace, as
explained above. Table III shows Lockheed's ranking by each ratio in
each year. It also shows Lockheed's rank according to the average









Ratio #1 Working Capital Flow /Total Debt
Figure 1
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Ratio #3 Funds Flow /Total Debt
Figure 3
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Working Capital Flow /Total Debt
Figure 17
Ratio #2
Net Monetary Assets Flow /Total Debt
Figure 18
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Funds Flow /Total Debt
Figure 19
Ratio #4
Net Income /Total Assets
Figure 20




Total Debt /Total Assets
Figure 21
Ratio #6
Current Assets /Total Assets
Figure 22





Quick Assets /Total Assets
Figure 23
Ratio #8
Working Capital /Total Assets
Figure 24
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Beaver's two studies and Dascher's study were the principal building
blocks upon which this thesis was based. All three works have shown
evidence that the non-liquid asset ratios were the best predictors of
long-term solvency. Beaver's 1966 study and the Dascher study
point out that failed firms' non-liquid asset ratios, if observed several
years before failure, tend toward a less favorable position when compared
with non-failed firms. An alternate way to detect a degerating position
is by observing a firm's ratio ranking. Dascher's work mentions that
a failed company's average ratio rank worsens as the year of failure
approaches.
A. 1966-1970
All of these symptoms, which have been shown to be highly
predictive, were evident in Lockheed's situation as 1971 drew near.
Accordingly, Lockheed was a likely candidate for bankruptcy in 1971.
1. Non-liquid Asset Ratios
While an analysis of most ratios supports a prediction of
bankruptcy, the three non-liquid asset ratios clearly demonstrate
this likelihood. In all three non-liquid asset ratios, Lockheed is
below the industry mean in 1970. This supports Beaver's hypothesis
of the non-liquid asset ratios being better indicators of long-term
insolvency than liquid asset ratios. With regard to the working
capital flow /total debt ratio (ratio #1), Lockheed had one bad year,
1968, and improved in all of the other years. In fact, the company is
below the industry mean in 1966 and 1968 only. However, when
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comparing this ratio to the other two funds flow ratios (ratios #2 and
#3), certain phenomena become obvious.
In comparing the working capital flow /total debt ratio to funds
flow from operations /total debt (ratio #3), it can be seen that most
of Lockheed's working capital flow comes from sources other than
operations. In Lockheed's case that source is primarily borrowing.
Also, in comparing working capital flow /total debt to the net monetary
assets flow /total debt ratio (ratio #2), it can be seen that a large
portion of the increase in working capital is being invested in inventory.
Lockheed's L-1011 inventory account in 1970 accounted for over
65 per cent of its total net inventory compared with less than 60 per
cent in 1969. Jjtef. 22, p. 28J
This L-1011 inventory's realization is so questionable that it
was one of the principal causes for the company receiving a qualified
opinion on its financial reports in 1969 and a disclaimer of opinion
in 1970. (Subsequent to the loan guarantee approval, Lockheed
received a supplemental report on 1970 from its auditors, Arthur
Young & Company, in which they expressed a qualified opinion.
fRef. 22, p. 26] )
2. Liquid Asset Ratios
The liquid asset ratios further support the findings of the
non-liquid asset ratios.
a. Liquid Asset/Total Asset Ratios
The liquid assets /total assets ratios (ratios #6, #7, #8, and
#9) show Lockheed's current assets /total assets ratio and working
capital/total assets ratio improving, while its quick assets /total assets
ratio is declining. This comparison again shows the growth of the
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inventory account. The cash/total assets ratio appears to show no
real trend. This is explained in that the cash is being supplied by
long-term debt to supplement weak earnings. With total assets so
greatly outweighing cash and with borrowing readily available to
keep the cash account steady, it would take a large increase in total
assets to decrease the ratio. For example, in 1968, Lockheed had
total assets of approximately $937 million and cash of roughly $2 8
million. The ratio was, thus, .03. In order to increase the value
of the ratio, say to . 04, and increase of cash of only $10 million
is needed if total assets are kept constant. Conversely, in order
to increase the ratio to .04 with cash kept constant, a decrease in
total assets of $237 million is needed. A large rise in borrowing
with an accompanying increase in total assets needs only a small
increase in cash to maintain a given ratio. (This assumes a year of
no profit and no stock transactions.) Thus, the cash/total assets
ratio isn't very meaningful when a company has a low cash /total assets
ratio and ready availability to borrowings,
b. Liquid Asset/Current Debt Ratios
The liquid asset/current debt ratios (ratios #10, #11 and
#12) show many of the same facts that the liquid asset/total assets
ratios do. That is Lockheed is depending on the realization of its
inventory account. More specifically, Lockheed is hoping to meet
current obligations with current assets that are becoming more and
more comprised of inventory. Lockheed's current assets are improving
relative to current debt, but the current assets are internally shifting
from highly realizable cash and accounts receivable to the not-so-
realizable inventory. This can be seen by the degradation of the
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quick ratio over time. The cash/current debt ratio is somewhat
meaningless because of the same reasons set forth in the last paragraph.
In fact, in this case, the numerator could be increased by long-term
borrowing and the borrowing transaction would not even affect the
denominator. This ratio, like the cash/total assets ratio, is
meaningless.
c. Turnover Ratios
Quick assets /sales (ratio #14), while not improving, constant-
ly outperforms the industry mean. Lockheed, having over 90 per cent
of its sales to DOD, has many government accounts receivable. These
are usually paid promptly. Hence, the favorable ratio results. When
Lockheed's slow turning inventory is included, however, the current
asset/sales and working capital/sales ratios (ratios #13 and #14)
worsen dramatically with time. This points out Lockheed's dependence
on ultimate realization of its inventories. The cash /sales ratio also
becomes worse with time, except in 1971; but, like the other ratios
with cash in the numerators, the value of this one is questionable also.
3. Rankings
Another way to look at solvency is to compare the yearly ratio
rankings. Lockheed's average ranking for all ratios fell from 4. 68
in 1966 to 5.93 in 1970. Moreover, its average ranking by Beaver's
three non-liquid asset ratios declines spectacularly from 3.0 in 1966
to 10. 66 in 1970. It should be noted that only ten firms were included
in 1966 and 11 firms were included in 1970. Still, the decline is
striking. The ranking by the two added ratios (ratios #1 and #2) gives
interesting results. The working capital flow /total debt ratio (ratio #1)




However, when the effect of a rising inventory is eliminated in the
net monetary assets flow /total debt ratio (ratio #2), the rank
deteriorates from position 7 to position 9. This comparison of ratios
#1 and #2 again shows Lockheed's dependence on inventory realization
and L-1011 sales.
4. Conclusion of Thesis for Years 1966-1970
Lockheed was very probably headed toward bankruptcy in 1971.
Not only was it out of cash (page 18), but many of its ratios had been
deteriorating for five years. The non-liquid asset ratios especially
show this degeneration. The only thing that prevents many of the
liquid ratios from hovering near the bottom is the inventory account,
which is carried on Lockheed's books at cost. (As is customary in
the industry, inventory is carried at the lower of cost or net realizable
value. Lockheed has stated that the cost is not in excess of estimated
realizable value.) With the decline in L-1011 sales, however, the
realization of those inventories is highly questionable.
Lockheed claimed it would fail without the loan guarantee. The
CPA firm of Arthur Young & Company refused to issue an opinion on
Lockheed's 1970 financial statements. With the guarantee, Arthur
Young & Company did grant a qualified opinion. Apparently, they felt
that the loan was necessary for Lockheed's survival.
This analysis of Lockheed shows a deterioration in many of
the financial ratios (especially the non-liquid asset ratios) as 1971
approaches. In addition, the position of Lockheed's ratios in an
industry ranking (again, especially the non-liquid ratios) deteriorates
as 1971 draws near. In the three papers upon which this thesis is




failure. The findings of this thesis tend to corroborate the allegation
by Lockheed's management that Lockheed was heading for bankruptcy
in 1971.
B. 1971-1972
Although Lockheed had received the loan guarantee, it claimed
to be heading for another financial crisis in late 1973. This was
brought about mainly when financially troubled Eastern Air Lines
delayed its scheduled acceptance of several L-lOlls. Slack sales
hurt the company also.
1. Non- liquid Asset Ratios
With the loan guarantee in 1971, many of Lockheed's financial
ratios received a vital lift. Two of Beaver's non- liquid asset ratios --
funds flow from operations /total debt (ratio #3) and net income /total
assets (ratio #4)--showed vast improvement. However, the funds
flow from operations /total debt ratio was still below the industry mean
and total debt /total assets (ratio #5) understandably continued to
worsen. Lockheed slightly exceeded the industry mean with the remain-
ing funds flow ratios (ratios #1 and #2). This is explained by the fact
that Lockheed's increased borrowings supported its working capital.
(Lockheed borrowed $125 million in 1971 and $55 million in 1972.)
2. Liquid Asset Ratios
The trends established in the previous five years generally
continued with regard to the liquid asset ratios. The ratios with
inventory in the numerator (ratios #6, #8, #10, #13, and #15) showed
a continued improvement, and most of the ratios without inventory in
the numerator displayed a continual downward trend. The one
notable exception in the latter category was the quick assets /sales
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ratio, which continued to exceed the industry average. It too, however,
showed a decrease. This decrease was due mostly to the decreased
dependency on DOD. In 1971, 92 per cent of Lockheed's sales were
to the Defense Department, while only 74 per cent of 1972's sales
were to DOD. [kef. 12, p. 2_)
3. Rankings
After an initial lift from 5. 93 in 1970 to 4. 56 in 1971, Lockheed's
average ranking for all ratios again deteriorated in 1972 to a rank of
5.37. (It should be noted that 11 firms were in the sample in 1970
and only ten in 1971 and 1972.) Likewise, Lockheed's average rank
for the non-liquid asset ratios rises from 10. 67 in 1970 to 7. 33 in
1971, but the rank drops again to 9. in 1972.
4. Conclusions of the Thesis for Years 1971-1972
Again, Lockheed's problem lies in its increased inventory
account and slow sales of the Tristar. In 1972 over 50 per cent of its
total assets and over 70 per cent of its current assets were L-1011
inventories. The company had only 176 orders and options at the end
of 1972 and, of these, only 17 were actually delivered. This is still
far from an alleged breakeven point of 300. That breakeven point,
itself, is considered highly optimistic.
Lockheed's financial ratios show its increased dependence on
realization of its inventories. In order to improve the ratios,
therefore, this inventory must be realized and sales must be increased.
With sales of the basic L-1011 drying up, the company has explored
Textron Corporation in May 1974 was willing to invest substantial
equity capital in Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. This investment,
however, was contingent upon Lockheed improving its financial position
by obtaining 45 more firm orders of the L-1011 "Tristar" by November 1974.
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the possibility of developing an extended-range version (L-1011-2) to
boost sales. It would have a range of 6300 miles instead of the basic
model's 3300 miles. [R ei « 23, p. 101 However, it will encounter
competition from both the extended- range DC- 10-30 and the jumbo
Boeing 747. To complicate matters further, Lockheed's basic L-1011
can't extend its range significantly without major engineering changes.
In contrast, the DC- 10 can be extended with only minor modifications
and, hence, much lower costs. Lockheed's current cash position will
not support a very heavy outlay of funds. Hence, to compete effectively
with the lower-cost DC- 10-30, the company must increase sales
substantially. [kef. 24, p. 23^
Another source of sales could be in what the firm calls the
L-1011-1. This version would require only small modifications but
would have only a 4500 mile range. IRef. 25, p. 4 \
Lockheed's future is highly uncertain, and its financial ratios
are heading again in the unfavorable direction. Nevertheless, the
company is not facing financial disaster as it was in 1970. Unlike
the last time, it has not claimed it was approaching bankruptcy and
Arthur Young & Company does express an opinion, albeit a qualified
opinion. While the values of the ratios and rankings are not the most
enviable, it would be premature to suggest Lockheed is again facing
bankruptcy. Its ratios merit constant scrutiny in the future, however,
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